616 PEDEEAL REPORTEE. �oughly fortified hj. autliority, that I am not disposed to depart from it. By the very fact of taking and holding under a bond for a deed to be thereafter executed by the vendor, such a purchaser recognizes the title of his vendor, and aclmowl- edges himself as holding in subordination, and not in antag- onism, to it. True, this relation may subseqaently be changed, and the purchaser may assume an adverse position; but, "when this is olaimed, it must be shown by proof. If it appears that he entered into possession under a, bond for a deed, and in amity \irith the holder of the fee, the law will presume a continuance of that relation until the contrary appears. And it is equally clear that one who purchases from the holder of a mere equity of this character takes no greater rights, or stronger equity, than his vendor possessed. . It is said that the lien of the vendor in such a case is sub- stantially a mortgage, and that a suit to foreclose a mortgage must be brought within the period fixed for commencing an action of ejectment to recover possession of the land. But this position is directly in conflict with the ruling of the supreme court of the United States in Lewis v. Hatvkins, supra, where it is held that "the possession of the mortgagor is not adverse to that of the mortgagee," and that to apply the statute of limitations "would be like making the lapse of time the origin of title in the tenant against his landlord;" aud where it is said that the lien of a mortgage "will be pre- sumed to have been satisfied after the lapse of 20 years from maturity of the debt," unless the laches be explained, and the presumption repelled. It seems to me that this decision es- tablishes the rule by which I must be governed as a matter of authority. It also commends itself to my mind as eminently just and reaeonable. ����
