CLAYTON V. SCHOO^^B EUZA B. KMOBT. 8eB �McKennan, C. J. Tàe libellants represent the majority ixi înterest. of the owners of the schooner Eliza B. Emory, and have brought this suit to obtain possession of the vesael. It is not denied that, under ordinary circumstances, this xight will be enforced against the minority interest in a vessel, in favor of the majority, but it is contended that John B. Clay- ton, whose interest must be uriited with that of the other libellants to make up a majority of the proprietary shares of the vessel, is estopped from asserting his right as owner, and that, therefore, a majority of the owners is not represented iii the libel. �John B. Clayton was one of the original owners of the Eliza B. Emory, and sailed her for some time as master. In April, 1874, Clayton sold to Weeks, as respondent, one- fiixteenth for $1,750, as a "sailing right of the vessel," and executed a bill of sale in the ordinary form for the sixteenth part of the vessel. Weeks was then mate, took command, and sailed the vessel until the fiUng of this libel. It is alleged that the value of a sixteenth was considerably below $1,760, and that the difference between the real value of such interest and the sum paid was the consideration of the "sailing right." Hence it is urged that John B. Clayton, having subsequently acquired another interest in the vessel, cannot gainsay the right of Week» to retain possession of her. The only ground upon which an estoppel can be supported, if at ail, is to be found in the testimony of Weeks, which is to the effect that Clayton offered to sell him one-:sixteenth "as a sailing right of the vessel," and that he bought that. interest at more than it was worth, b^cause he understoodthathe was thereby acquiring the "sailing right;" or, in other words, that if Weeks bought a sixteenth he would thereby acquire a right to the possession of the vessel, and to sail her as master. Now this is not the statement of a fact within the knowledge of one party upon whose representation of its existence the other party relied and was misled, but it was the statement of a legal result as to which both parties might form their own judgment, as they had Uke means of information respeoti»g ����
