Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 4.djvu/368

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854 ÏEDBEAL SBPORTEB. �Bkown, D. J. This suit was removed under the second section of the act of March 3, 1875. This section proyides for the removal of suits between citizens of different statea in two classes of cases: First, cases in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states, in which case "either party" may remove the suit into the proper circuit court; second, cases in which there shall be a contro- versy "between citizens of different states, and which can be fuUy determined as between them," in which case "either one or: more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in sueb iîontroversy may remove said suit to the circuit court of the United States." --• �In construing the first clause of this section it bas been upiformly held that the words "either party" conrprehend ail the individuals upon one side of the contfoversy, and that ail Buch individual parties must unite in the petition. The Re- moval Cases, 100 U. S. 457; C. e St. L., etc., B. Ce. v. Ma- comb, 9 Eep. 569; Ruckman y. Palisade Land Co. 1 Fed. Eep. 367; In re Fraser's Estate, 6 Eep. 357; National Bank v. Dodge, 25 Int. Eev. Eec. 304. ' �These decisions were a mere application to the actof 1875 of the rule which had obtained with reference to removal under previous açts. Under the judiciary act of 1789 it had been well established that ail of the defendants must unite in- a petition for removal. Smith v. Bines, 2 Sum. 338 ; Beardsley v. Terrey, 4 Wash. 286; Ward v. Arredondo, 1 Paine, 410. �The second clause of section 2, under which the removal of this case must be supported, if at ail, was undoubtedly in- tended to apply to a different class of cases from those men- tioned in the first clause; otherwise the firat clause is unnec- sary. The first clause, as well as the second, contemplates a controversy wholly between citizens of different states, and which can be fully determined as between them. But it would not be consonant with sound principles of consti^uction to say that both of these clauses meant the same thing, and gave the parties the option of petitioning jointly or severally. The sec- ond clause evidently contemplates not only a controversy ����