BATEMAU ». rAEGASON. 33 �fessîon of fraud upon his wife, and the maxim is mvoked that "He who cornes into equity must do so with clean hands." The prineiple indicated by the maxim only appliea to the conduct of the party in respect to the particular trans- action under consideration, for th« court will not go outside of the case for the purpose of examining the conduct of the plaintiff in other matters, or questioning his general charac- ter for fair dealing. Bisph. Eq. 61. It does not nxean a general depravity; it must have an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for; it, must be depravity in a legal as well as moral sense. Bering y. Winchelsea, 1 Cox, Ch. 318; Nichols v. Cabe, 3 Head, 92; Sharp v. Caldivell, 1 Humph. 415; Mulloy v. Young, 10 Humph. 298; Kelton v. MUiken, 2 Cold. 410; Lewis' Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 153, 166. �If it be conceded that the coereion of the wife is evidence of moral turpitude, — and certainly no court ean, at this day, do less than severely reprehend such conduct, — still, the plain- tiff will not be repelled unless the iniquity complained of in him is connected with and a part of the very transaction as to which he seeks relief. It seems to me plain that, while the coereion of the wife was a method of perfecting the de- fendant's title to the land, and in that sense connected with the transaction, it is not a part of it. The subject of con- troversy is the usury in the account, and the other alleged false and fraudulent items as to which there is said to have been an unfair settlement. �The land was given in payment, and the deeds made to effectuate the payment are recited in the bill ; the relief asked being to correct the settlement, and to hold it as payment only for so much as is actually due, charging the defendant as trustee for the balance. The case stands as if money had been paid in settlement of defendant's account, and we should be asked to repel the plaintiff because it appeared that he procured the money from some third party — his wife, for ex- ample — by questionable and, it may be, fraudulent practiees. I do not see that such a case falls within the maxim or rule of equity invoked by the demurrer. �The object of the bill ia to surcharge and falsify the mer- �v.4,no.l — 3 ����
