BTEXRS O, SANI&I<. 593 �Hammond, D. J. This case is to be decided apon the issues made by Freeman's cross-bill, and stands as if he had en- joined further proceedings upon the venditioni exponas. If a sale had taken place under that writ, Dawson, the execution plaintiff, would be entitled to the money, no matter what kind of a title had been conveyed, Hutchman's Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 209. On the other hand, Freeman can claim noth- ing under the Steers writ of attachaient, and it is immaterial how the case would stand as between Steers and Dawson, or what would have been the resuit of a controversy between the marshal and the sheriff on the facts of this case. Happily, that controversy is out of the way. �The facts as to the sheriff's levy are only important as throwing light on the question of abandonment by the mar- shal. Freeman claims that the levies were abandoned at the time the deed of trust was made to him, if not as to the lease- hold, certainly as to the machinery, which he claims was per- sonal property, whether the leasehold was or not, and that as to neither did the marshal keep up that dominion and control which the law requires to perfect Dawson's title. It does not lie in the mouth of Daniel, or any one claiming under him with notice, to predicate upon the conduct of the mar- shal any claim of abandonment. If it was an illegal and unauthorized act of the judge, the clerk, or the marshal to suspend proceedings, it was a fraud on Dawson for Daniel to procure the suspension, and he can take no advantage of it. If the acts of the judge, the clerk, and the marshal were valid, the "order" did no more than suspend proceedings where it found them. An injunetion may have operated to rdease the levy, but not such a proceeding as that. Bisbee v. Hall, 3 Ohio, 449. Freeman's conveyance was made while the pro- ceedings were pending, The marshal's return disclosed the levy, and precisely how and in what manner it was suspended; and, moreover, Daniel was in possession as receiver under this Steers bill, to which Dawson was a party. Freeman could not, therefore, be a purchaser without notice, even if he can be treated as a purchaser for value at ail, where the trust is to secure antecedent debts. However the conduct of �T.4,no.7— 38 ����
