Si FEVEZiXi SEFOBTEB. �■whîcli induced him to take this step, it may well be supposed, was altogether a personal one, viz,: his desire to escape the criminal conBequences of the embezzletnent of trust funds. �It is a well-recoguized rule that neither the acts nor knowl- edge of the officer of a corporation will bind it in a matter in ■which he acts for himself and deals with the corporation as if he had no officiai relations to it. Angell & Ames on Corp. § 308; Winchester v. Balt & S. B. Co. 4 Md. 231; Com- mercial Bank v. Cunninghnm, 24: Pick. 270; Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 Mich. 44; First Nat. Bank of Hightsiown v. Christo- pher, 40 N. J. (Law) 435 ; Barnes v. The Trenton Gas-light Co. 12 C. E. Green (N. J. Eq.) 33. Thus, where the general superintendent of a corporation conveyed laiid to it, the cor- poration, it was held, was not ohargeable with his knowledgo of an adverse claim to the land. Wickersham v. Chicago Zinc Co. 18 Kan. 481. The corporation agent's knowledge, when acting for himself, is noi the knowledge of the corporation, Id, I hold the present case to fall within this principle. �If my agent, who had fallen in arrears in his accounts, had voluntarily made me a payment during the life-time of the bankrupt law, would any one pretend that I could be deprived of the benefit of such payment upon the ground of construct- ive notice of his insolvency and intent unlawfully to prefer me, if in fact I were ignorant thereof and free f rom guilty col- lusion with such agent ? And why should the defendant cor- poration, upon the ground of imputed knowledge, be com- pelled to surrender a preference which it acquired innocently, and without actual knowledge of any intended fraud upon the bankrupt law? Having obtained the fund in controversy honestly, the defendant can in good faith retain it. �The motion for a new trial is denied; and it is ordered that iudgment for the defendant be entered u^jon the verdict. ����
