778 FEDKRAL EEPORTEH. �case for the exercise Of the discretion of the court. There has been one sale which has been set aside for inadequacy of priee, The property has been resold, and has brought a sum near its value. AU the court could do — ail Judge Blodgett could do in the district court — would be simply to order a resale, and perhaps declare that the $35,000 or $36,000 should be considered as a bid made. Our practice has never been to allow the receiver or the master, as the case may be, in a judi- cial sale, to receive a bid, as in England, privately. On the contrary, the prao ' ' e bis been to bave the property re-offered for sale, and treat the advance offer made aa a bid at the sale. Perhaps I ought to say something about the purchaser. I think a purchaser at a judicial sale may be said to be clothed ■with some rights -when he makea a bid for the property, and the hammer falls, and the bid accepted by the master or receiver. True, the rights which exist in him are subject to the action of the court ; but that action depends upon the gen- erai principles and usages of law. It cannot be said that it is a discretion which is merely arbitrary on the part of the court, or capricious; but it must aot upon well-settled and generally-recognized principles of equity in cases of this kind, and, if it disregard those principles, the rights of the purchaser can ordinarily be protected in another court. So that the bid- der certainly has rights which can be protected by a court of equity. I therefore advise that the order of the district court shall stand confirming the sale. �KoTB. See Blackburn t. The Stima B. Oo. 8 Fbd. Rbp. 689. ����
