LOW V. DURFEE. 269 �from, precisely as lie would be under the law of the state. The plaintiff admits that under section 991, if the insolvent had been in prison when the discharge \ras granted,. he could immediately thereafter demand his release ; but, as he was not, it is insisted that he must now be imprisoned. When he is once in prison the plaintiff will be prepared to argue that he cannot be released, because the judgment has been ren- dered since his certiôcate of discharge in insolvency was granted, and, therefore, is not affected by it. The statute is not open to the reproach of having omitted to provide for this case. The two sections reach ail cases provided for by the laws of the state. �Again, the other difficulty, which existed in 1854, has dis- appeared. The Eevised Statutes have adopted the forms and modes of proceeding of the several states, not as they were in 1828, but as they were in 1874, and shall be from time to time. Eev. St. § 914. We are bound, therefore, to issue such an execution as the courts of the state would issue in like circumstances ; and that is an execution against the property, but not against the body, of the defendant. Choieau V. Richardson, 12 Allen, 365. �The objection of the plaintiff that this exemption extends only to the territory of Massachusetts is sound in law, and if the petition asked for a modification of the judgment, so that no proeess should ever issue anywhere in any action founded upon this judgment, itmust be refused; but ail thatis asked for is a modification of a writ, which is available only within this district, which is co-extensive with the commonwealth of Massachusetts. �Action dismissed as against the assignees, without costs, unless the plaintiff elects to take judgment for the purposes of proof in insolvency, in which case that election is to be expressed in the judgment, and no execution will issue. If execution is taken out, it is to be against Durfee only, and to be modifled as prayed for. ����
