490 FBDEEAL BEPOETEB. �or any other portion of this account, until the bringing of this suit in November, 1877. It thus appears that he re- tained the last aecount more than a year without objection. This warrants fully the presumption that he acquiesced in the accounts, and it ia unnecessary that he should bave given an express assent. Wiggins v. Burkham, 10 Wall. 129. The defendant, however, says that acquiescence ought not to be presumed, because he did not in faet know what rate of interest was charged to bim in bis accounts. �It is perhaps a sufficient answor to this to say that, having been in the receipt of these monthly accounts for a year, if he did not know be should bave known that he was bound to examine them enough to discover what a very slight exam- ination would bave disclosed, upon the principle that a party is chargeable with knowledge when the means of knowledge are within bis reacb. Ogden v. astor, 4 Sandf. 332. It would, indeed, be wrong to permit the defendant to lie by without objection wbile bis broker advanced large sums for him upon the understanding that the rate of interest was to be as charged. But there can be no reasonable doubt that Strouse did know and assent to the rate of interest as charged. Hia account was large, the interest charge alone some months amounting to over $800. �The account for July is as follows : ���July 1. To balance, ��<• ��$39,695 73 ��" 10. Assesst. 200 Davey, ��B m ��100 00 ��", 30. 30 Ophir, 57, - ��- ��1,710 00 ��Com. and tel. ��• ��18 60 ��" 31, Interest^ ��' ��817 50 ��Cr. ������July 12. Div'd 50 con. va., - ��• ��500 00 ��" 31. Balance, ��- ��$41,841 83 ���It is impossible to believe that any businesp man could receive so simple an account and not know from it the rate of interest be was charged. The testimony shows that these accounts were rendered for the purpose of , informing the de- fendant how bis account stood. The dealings between the ����
