220 FEDEEAIi REPORTER. �607; Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9; WoodY.Dummer, 3 Mason, 308; Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626; Lyman v. Bonney, 101 Mass. 562; Deerfield v. Nims, 110 Mass. 115; Mann v. Pentz, 3 N. Y. 422. �The three cases cited by the plaintiff were ail decided under a code which CKpressly makes it discretionaty with the judge to order notice to the principal defendant or not. The only possible question, therefore, was of the constitutionality of the statute. Gihson v. Haggerty, 37 N. T. 555; Bishop v. Garcia, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 70; Lynch v. Johnson, 48 N. Y. 27. The case of Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205, did not turn upon this point. It appears that the corporation was made a party and af terwards dropped ; but no question was raised about it. The corporation may have made no issue with the plaintiff, or ail parties may have agreed to the dismissal. The question argued and decided was whether ail stockhold- ers must be parties. �I cannot see how it is possible, consistently with the decis- ions and the uniform practice, to decide this case in the absence of the corporation. If it had been aotually dissolved, the case might be different. There are allegations which corne as near to that as truth will permit, I suppose : that it has ceased to do business ; that its bridge bas been sold under a foreclosure; and that it is defunct "to ail intente and purposes." I do not understand this to mean that it is eo longer capable of suing and being sued, but that it is dead for ail useful purposes as a bridge-owner. If it remains subject to process, the facts alleged appear to be immate- rial. I infer, from the facts whioh are stated, that it is se liable at present. �Demurrer sustained. ��� �
