E0CKMAN V. BUCKMAN. 2-27 �so, and that the mortgage was hers, and that after their sep- aration he promised to send it to her, but never did so. �It is not insisted that in order to oonstitute the delivery of a deed it is necessary that it should be in fact handed over to the grantee, or to a person in trust for him ; but where there is no actual handing over of the deed some act must be done, or woxd spoken, to indicate sueh an intent, in order to make it effectuai. Its mere execution, or putting it on record after execution, without the knowledge of the grantee, is not suffi- cient. Washburn says : "A delivery of a deed is as essential to the passing of an estate as the signing; and so long as the grantor retains the legal control of the instrument, the title cannot pass any more than if he had not signed the deed.
- * * So long as the deed is within the control of the
grantor, and subject to bis authority, it cannot be held to have been delivered." 3 Wasfhb. E. P. 577, 680. To the same effect are the cases of Crawford v. Berthoff, Saxton, 487; FoUey v. Vantuyl, 4 Hal. L. 158; and Cannon v. Cannon, 11 C. E. G. 319. I can find no evidence tending to show that the bond, mortgage, or assignment was ever ont of the posses- sion or control of the defendant Ruckman, or that he ever performed an act indicating an intent to make a delivery of them to the complainant. A naked voluntary promise is not enough to support a gift of a chattel, unless it is followed by some performance. �Pailing to establish any title to the mortgage, the bill of complaint must be dismissed. ��� �
