448 FEDERAL BKPOBTEB. �cided upon the bill of foreclosure, but the question does arise as to the rigbt of the mortgagor to execute the mortgage, and whether or not be should be foreclosed and forever barred from setting up any claim to the land covered by the mort- ���Now, I tbink I may say to the counsel that there ought not to be two litigationa upon the questions to whioh the court bas adverted; that is to say, in two different courts. I admit that it is quite possible that the court may go on in this case and make a decree forever barring the equities of the University of Chicago, and preventing it from ever setting up any claim to this land, and placing this plaintif, so far as the University of Chicago is concerned, in possession; but still there may be a right outside of that, existing in a third party, which would not be interfered with by this decree. I do not desire, if it can be avoided, to issue an injunction in this case, even if I have the right to do so. I have stated these views upon the questions of law involved, and I leave it to the counsel to determine v?hether it sball become neces- sary for the court to take any positive action. �I think it may be the right and duty of the court, if it sh ail become necessary, to prevent any parties in the state court litigation, who are also parties here, from going on and raising the question whether or not the University of Chicago had the right to execute this mortgage, and whether it is to be estopped by the decree of this court; for these are ques- tions, I think, this court has the exclusive right to determine, — the court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the sub- ject-matter, — and I think the decision of the court would be, as to the University of Chicago, binding in ail courts. I leave the matter, therefore, without any order being made at this time, for the consideration of counsel. ��� �
