Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 6.djvu/570

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568 FJEDEEAL EBPOKTBR. �In the case of Frankfdrt d PJiiladelphia Passenger Co. v. City of PhUadelphia, 68 Pa. St. 119, where the license fee was the aame, and Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 445, the supreme court of Pennsylvania took a different view of such an ordinance, and treated it as a police regulation merely ; and such seems to be the view of the supreme court of this state in the case of the Chicago Packing e Provision Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 111. 221. �In the case of Frankfort d Philadelphia Passenger Co. v. City of Philadelphia, the city pbtained its power to impose the license from a statute substantially similar to that under which the city of Chicago claims the power in this case. In that case the act of the legislature declared that the city couneil of Philadelphia should have authority to provide for the proper regulation of omnibuses, or vehicles in the nature thereof, and to this end "it shall be lawful for the couneil to provide for the issuing of licenses to such and so many per- sons as may apply to keep and use omnibuses, or vehicles in the nature thereof, and to charge a reascnable annual or other sum therefor." In that statute the words "vehicles in the nature thereof," in this the words "pursuing a like occu* pation," are used. I cannot see that there is auy cubstantial distinction in that respect between the two statutes. �In the case of 88 Illinois, already referred to, the corpora- tion was organized and doing business under the laws of this state. A question arose in that case as to the power of the city to issue a license. It was denied in the argument of the case that the power existed, but the supreme court held that, under the power "to regulate the management" of the busi- ness, the city had the right to issue a license and to prescribe the compensation. That was also under the same law — the act of 1872 — whiob conferred power upon cities to grant licenses and regula,te omnibus drivers, and ail others pur- suing a like occupation, and to prescribe their compensation. The supreme court of this state decides in that case that the power to require a license is one of the means of regulating the exercise of a pursuit or business ; that there are other means that might be adopted to accomplish the purpose, but ��� �