578 fsdekaIi befobteb. �signes,: on whose skill and personal integrity he relies fora jitidicious sale of the property consigned. If the consignee advances on the shipment, at the close of the transaction the consigner is entitled to receive the proceeds of the sale, lesa advances, charges, and commissions. But if the consignee is permitted to pledge. the- consignor's property to the amount of aidvances and charges, and the pledgee controls the sale of the property, — it may be at forced sale, irrespective of the con- dition of the market, etc., — the consignor's right may be sac- rificed, his reliance on the pcrsonal judgment and skill of hi» eonsignee set at naught, and another and injurions mode of disposing of bis property pursued — a mode never contem- plated by him. Still, if cuch a mode is lawful, he is oom- pelled to submit thereto*, How, then, shall he be bound, as in favor pf the pledgee, for advances ? or, in other words, to what evidence of advances made or to be made shaU the pledgee be.eonfined? The act of ,1874, supra, gives the rule. There must be written authority for advances, and a draft or order drawn by the consignor against the shipment is to be cpnsid- ered such written authority. It is thus under statutory safe- guards that the consignor may make his shipments. He knows that his consignee may pledge for charges, but cannot pledge for advances without written authority, as by draft or order. Hence, justice is wrought. Unless he receives an advance, or by written authority orders such to be made, his property cannot be pledged therefor. It is very easy for the pledgee to eall for the written authority, such as the statute requires, and if he takes a pledge from the factor for supposed advances, when no written authority exists, he cannot hold the property therefor against the consignor's rights. �The decisions in Wisconsin and elsewhere, looking to dif- ferent conclusions from those reached by this court, have received careful consideration. There is nothing in the Mis- souri Statutes to justify a Jfactor's pledge for more than ad- vances and charges, and the evidence of advances is conuned to written authority therefor. A factor cannot sell or pledge for his individual debt, but he can seU to pay such advances and chargea, or pledge therefor, or sell in theusual course of ��� �
