674 FEDEBAIi BBFOBTBit. �of law, that the excessive use of alcoholic liquors is a perni- cious habit that obviously tends to shorten life. I regard that proposition as a matter of fact, and as a fact of such uni- versal knowledge as to have become axiomatic." The jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff. On a motion for new triaJ by defendant, Shipman, J., said: "The motion for a new trial is granted upon the ground that the verdict was, in my opinion, plainly eontrary to the evidence in the cause." The admission during the trial of the evidence taken under the commission was objected to by counsel for plaintiff, citing Knecht v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 8 Ins. Law Journal, 639, and the following opinion was delivered by ike court on this ques- tion. �John L. mil anaJohn J, Thomasson, for plaintiff. �Julien T. Davies and Roger Poster, for defendant. �Shipman, D. J. The question pending at the adjournment yesterday was as to the admissibility of evidence to show that after the date of the policy the person whose life was insured, though previously temperate, formed the habit of intemperance. The clause in the policy referring to this sub- ject is as follows: "This policy is issuedand accepted bythe assured upon the following express conditions and agree- ments ; * * * if any of the statements and declarations made in the application for this policy, upon the faith of which this policy is issued, shall be found in any respect untrue, then, and in every such case, this policy shall be null and void." The general character and legal effect of a similar clause in a life policy was considered by the supreme court in Jeffreys V. Life Lis. Co. 22 Wall. e7. The clause in that policy de- clared that the policy was made by the company upon the express condition and agreement that the statements and declarations made in the application for the policy, and on the faith of which it was issued, were in ail respects true. The question before the court was whether the untruth of any statement or declaration made the policy void, or whether the untruth of such statements only as were material to the risk had such effect. The court says: "This stipulation is not ?xpressed to be made as to important or material statements ��� �
