773 FEDERAL REPORTER. �to compel payment of his debt out of the equitable interesta and things in action of the judgment debtor. Storin v. Wad- dell, 2 Sandf. Ch. 510-12." �The authorities cited by the assistant vice-chancellor strongly support his reasoning; and I am justified in holding that, by the ancient usages of courts of equity as understood in New York prior to the Eevised Statutea, chancery "would assist a judgment creditor at law in discovering and reaching Personal property which had been placed in other hands ; and that it made no difference whether that property consisted of choses in action or money or stock." 2 Kent's Com. 561. �In Donavan v. Fin, the point decided was that "where the subject of a suit is exclusively legal, eqnity has no jurisdic- tion to enforce or give a better remedy;" that is, to seize upon and apply to the payment of the debt equitable assets, which could not be reached by execution at law. �In Pettit V. Chandler, 3 Wend. 624, the same point arose incidentally, though it was not decided; but the chief justice said "his impressions were that, under the existing law (1829) a defendant is not bound to answer as tcf property which never was within reach of an execution ; that he could only be called on to respond as to such property as he has fraudulently withdrawn from the operation of an execution." �In Hadden v. Spader, Mr. Justice Woodworth held that a judgment creditor, after exhausing the remedies given by law, could reach the trust property of his debtor by the aid of a court of equity, and that he could report to the debtor's stocks and debts due to him, even when the stocks were not purchased or the debts created by means of the property fraudulently with- d/raumfrom the judgment of the creditor. To these views Chief Justice Spencer gave his explicit sanction. �Chancellor Sandford was of opinion, as we have seen, that the relief could only be given in cases which were themselves of equitable jurisdiction involving fraud or trust, or seeking to subject to the satisfaction of a judgment property in itself liable to execution, by removing a conveyanee which operated as a fraudulent impediment to the execution. �In Pettit V. Chandler, the chief iustice. Mr. Justice Marcv ��� �
