BOBINSON V. MEUPHIS 6 CHAIiLESTON B. CO. 131 �ton mentioned, nor any part thereof, was never delivered or came into the possession of defendant, or any of its agents, for transportation or for any other purpose, wherefore the Ipill of lading is false and fraudulent, and was issued withbut authority froni the defendant," etc. �To these pleas the plaintiffs demur, except to the flrst, on which issue is joined. The grounds of demurrer are stated to be that — �"(1) The pleas are not sufflcient in law," etc. "(2) They do not aver that the defendant did not contract and agree to d«liver," etc., " as alleged in the decla- ration. (3) They do not aver that the defendants did not make, execute, and issue the bill of lading. (e) They do not show such a state of facts as will prevent a recovery. The f acts averred in the declaration estop the defendants from denying the actual receipt of the cotton," eto, �Freeman dt McCorry and Mme e Buford, (of Jackson, Tenn,,) for plaintiffs. �Campbell A Jackson , (of Jackson, Tenn.,) for defendant. �Hammond, D. J. No technical objections have been raised as to the form of any of the pleadings in this case, nor bas the case been strictly argued on the facts as they appear by the pleadings. The difficulty is that the second and third pleas are not special pleas, stat- ing the pairticular facts, and amount to no more than the general deniai of the first, on which issue bas been joined. Of course, if the bill of lading "was given, executed, and signed without authority from this defendant," and the demurrer admits this, there can be no recov- ery in any view of the case ; but the allegation amounts to no more than that of the first plea, that the company "did not contract, under- take," etc. Nor is the statement contained in these pleas, that the cotton was never delivered to the company, anything more than this general deniai of the first plea ; for neither of the pleas admita the bill of lading to have been signed by an agent of the company who would have Leen authorized to sign it if the cotton had been delivered, although that important fact bas been assumed in the argument. The allegation of these pleas, that the bill of lading was "false and fraudulent," is a mere conclusion of law, based upon the other allegations that it was issued without authority, and that no cot- ton was delivered for transportation. The court understands from counsel on both sides that there was an agent of the defendant com- pany at Jackson authorized to sign bills of lading when cotton was actually delivered to him, or the company's other agents, for trans- portation, — the defendant contending that this was a special agency arising only on actual delivery of cotton, while the plaintiff treats him as a general agent of the largest powers ; that this man Chiles, either by collusion with this agent or by false representations to him, pro- cured him to sign the bill of lading in controversy without any aot- ��� �
