BOBINSON V. MEMPHIS & CHARLESION R. 00. 133 �"first," "second," and third." The firsE he indorsed to the plain- tiffs for advances made, and afterwards, the goods being entered at a warehouse in the shipper's naine, he dishonestly gave orders to other persons for the goods, assigning the "second" part of the bill of lading, upon which the goods were delivered. The plaintiffs sued the warehouseman, and the queen's bench division gave judgment for the value of the goods. That court calls attention to the f act that the carrier would not have been liable, though the concession is Bomewhat reluctantly made, because he was not bound to settle con- flicting claims, and might deliver the goods to' an apparent owner holding either part of the bill of lading. I have not seen the report of the judgment of the court of appeal reversing the queen's bench division, but it must have been on the ground that the warehouse- man was equally protected with the carrier. 16 Am. Law Eev. (N. S.) 156. I cite the case to show that while the law holds a carrier to a very rigid and often harsh degree of liability for the performance of his contract qua carrier, it does not readily impose any outside liability or embarrassment upon him. And this is m the interest of commerce, and in pursuance of that public policy which encourages the unembarrassed transportation of goods by common carriers. Their business is that of transportation, and they are not engaged in issuing bills of lading as negotiable securities, to be used as such for the convenience of bankers, brokei's, and commercial men. A bill of lading is issued primarily as an evidence of their executory contract to carry, and the acknowledgement of the receipt of the goods for that purpose is only inoidental, — the mere aVerment of a fact for the purpose of founding thereon the contract to carry. Now, commer- cial men have, from time immemorial, for their own advantage, and not at all for that of the carrier, let it be remembered, treated these documents as convenient symbols or muniments of title, and as in- struments of transfer of title, and they have, for that purpose, acquired among them a qimsi negotiability or capacity to pass from hand to hand by indorsement. But the carrier is not at all bene- fited by this, and it is not for his gain that it is done. Mr. Justice Glifford defines a bill of lading thus : "Such an instrument acknowl- edges the bailment of the goods, and is evidence of a contract for the safe custody, due transport, and right delivery of the same, upon the terms as to freight therein described, the extent of the obligation being. specified in the instrument." The Delaware, 14 Wall. 579, 596. It seems to me, with all deference, that it is a misapprehension of ��� �
