136 FEDERAL REPORTER. �carelesslj neglect to take the precautions that would protect them- Belves. �The rule contended for would make bills of lading in thia regi)ect negotiable, like bills of exchange or other representations of money, which they are not. 2 Daniell, Neg. Inst. (2d Ed.) §§ 1727, 1751. Mr. Justice Strong puis this claim for them at rest when he says : �" The f unction of that instrument is entirely different from a bill or note. It is not a representation of money used for transmission of money, or for the payment of debts, or for purchases. It does not pass from hand to hand, as bank notes or coin. It is a contract for the performance of a duty. True, it is a symbol of ownership of the goods covered by it — a representation of those goods. * * * Bjug of lading are regarded as so much eottoil, grain, iron or other articles of merchandise. The merchandise is very often sold or pledged by the transfer of the bills which cover it. ihey are, in commerce, a very different thing from bills of exchange and promissory notes, answering a different purpose and performing different functions. It cannot be, there- fore, that the statute which made them negotiable by indorsement and delivery, or negotiable in the same manner as bills of exchange and promis- sory notes are negotiable, intended to change totally their character, put them in all respects on the footing of instruments which are the representations of money, and charged the negotiation of them with all the consequences which usually attend or follow the negotiation of bills and notes. Some of these consequences would be very strange, if not impossible, such as the liability of indorsers, the duty of domand ad diem, notice of non-delivery by the carrier, etc., or the loss of the owner's property by the fraudulent assignment of a thief." Shaw v. Railroad Co. 101 TJ. S. 557, 564. �If a statute like that described by the learned justice does not so resuit, how can a careless belief of the plaintiffs in this case, that this bill of lading was what it purported to be, have the effect of sub- jecting the carrier to the same liability as if it had issued a bill of exchange or promissory note without receiving the consideration for it ? Or the same resuit as if an agent, authorized to sign its notes, had executed and negotiated one on his own account to defraud the principal? Lowell Bank v. Winchester, 8 Allen, 109. �Nor do I see why the local or special custom averred in this decla- ration, or any general custom of dealmg with bills of lading as if they possessed this element of negotiability, should give it to them as against the carrier, or enlarge his liability on them. Whart. Ag. §§ 134, 675, 676; The Beeside, 2 Sumn. 567, 569; Turiiey v. Wilson, 7 Yerg. 340 ; 6 8o. Law Eev. (N. S.) 845; The Delaware, 14 Wall, at pp. 602, 603; Blakemore v. Heyman, 6 Fed. Eep. 581. �The most plausible argument in favor of the plaintifs is that the carrier, having authorized an agent to sign bills of lading, is estopped ��� �
