BKOWN V. THE JEFFERSON COU^IY NAT. BANK. 261 �1867, and from section 5021. In either view, the word "suffer" disappeared entirely from the bankruptcy statute when the amend- atory bankruptcy act of 1874 was enacted. �But aside from this, the only other view would be that, if the effect of section 12 of said act of 1874 is only to strike out the word "suffer" from section 39 of the act of 1867, and the word "suffers" from section 5021, leaving the word "Buffers"in section 5128, although the word "suf- fer" was not in section 35 of the act of 1867, we have simply a reversai of the state of things commented on in Wilson v. City Bank. We have "procures" or "suffers," in section 5128, still in force — that section representing section 35 of the act of 1867; and we have only "pro- cures" without "suffers" in section 5021 — that section representing sec- tion 39 of the act of 1867, as amended by section 12 of the said act of 1874. In Wilson v. City Bank we had "procure or suffer" in said section 39, and we had "procures" alone, without "suffers," in said section 85. In this state of things the same ruling that was made in Wilson v. City Bank would apply to the transposed enactments, and the strong inference would be that the act • of suffering the debtor's property to be attaohed or seized on execution, in section 5128, as representing said section 35, is preeisely the same as pro- curing it to be taken on legal process, in said section 39, as so amended. So, in any event, practically, the word "suffer" is abol- ished and the word "procure" alone remains. Moreover, the history of the legislation and of the judicial decisions on it shows that the word "procure" cannot have attached to it any of the meaning which properly attached to the word "suffer," as distinguished from the word "procure." In Wilson v. City Bank it was said by the court that the act of suffering or the act of procuring, which are the same, must be accompanied by the intent specified in the statute; that in both there must be the positive purpose of doing an act forbidden by the statute, and the thing described must be done in the promo- tion of Buch unlawful purpose ; that the facts of that case did not show any positive or affirmative act of the debtors from which such intent might be inferred; that through the whole of the legal pro- ceedings against them they remained perfectly passive ; that they e owed a debt which they were unable to pay when it became due ; that the crediter sued them and reeovered judgment, and levied execution on their property; that they afforded him no facilities to do this, and they interposed no hindrance; that it cannot be inferred that a man intends, in the sense of desiring, promoting, or procuring it, a result of other persons' acts, when he contributes nothing to their ��� �
