338 FBDEBAL BEPOETEB. �tion. The defendant proved that the car in question did not belong to it, but was a foreign car. At the close of the evidence defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that, under the evidence and pleadings in the case, plaintili couid not recover; but the instruction was refused. �Teeat, D. J., thereupbn cbarged the jury as follows: Gentlemen of the jury : It is proper, in the consideration of this case, that you should bear in mind the difference in law between the obligations of an employer to an employe, and the obligations of a railroad to a stranger. In the latter case the utmost degree of diligence Is required — extraordinary diligence. The casebefore you involves a f ew propositions of law in the light of which you should consider the testimony; these propositions being, in the first place, that an employe who undertakes work, though the same may be of a dangei - ous character, is supposed to be competent to the discharge of that duty, as- sumingfor himself all ordinary risks eonnected therewith; second, that the employer, to-wit, the railroad company, as in thls case, must f umish him with reasohably and adequately safe appliances for the performance of his duties. Eailroads, as in the case before you, are bound to receive cars from other roads, to handle thera, and to haul them, and a brakeman or other employe of the defendant road is supposed to know that carsof different construction, and, possibly, of different modes of coupling, will be used in the conduct of the business of the railroad company ; and the brakemau or other employe, though those cars eoming onto the road may be more or less dangerous than the ordinary cars, is supposed to be competent to attend to his business, nOtwitTi- ing such cars are used. In other words, this is not a question of comparison between freight cars of the Iron Mountain Eailroad, owned by itself, and other cars thut it may haul over its road in connection with its respective trains. Behind that rests the main inquiry: Did this defendant road — no matter whether the car was a foreign car — put into its train a car which was not reasonably and adequately safe for the purpose for which it was used, in Connection with the duties which the servants had to perform? In other words, though there might be differences in the construction of foreign cars, as compared with the cars belonging to the Iron Mountain Eailroad itself; though there might be different degrees of danger eonnected with the hand- ling of the different cars ; yet this Refendant was bound that no car, whether its own or a foreign car, should be otherwise than reasonably and adequately safe for its employes to handle and to manage in the ordinary conduct of their business. Consequently the strain in this case seems to be this: Was this car of which you have heard not adequately safe to be put into the train, whereby an employe, — a brakeman, for instance, — in undertaking to niake the coupling, could not, by the exercise of ordinary care and skill on his part, escape accident? Of course, every one engaging in a particular business, employed therefor, is presumed^s bound in law — at his own bazard to exer- cise ordinary care and diligence with respect to the employment in which be is engaged. He is presumedto be competent therefor; yet, on the other hand, his employer — as a railroadj for instance — is' bound on its part to furnish liim with reasonably safe and adequate appliances, whereby, in the exercise of ��� �
