PEOVOST ». PIDOEON. 411 �suggestedfor supposing her place of residence to have been changed. She had no place of business at Long Island city or elsewhere, and the only place where she was likely to be found, so as to be personally served, was at the home of herself and husband in Saugerties. That is within this district. It was the marshaVs first duty to seek her there. He was not bound to go elsewhere, except upon some further definite information of her whereabouts. Having no reason to sup- pose her absent. from her home, he had no right to forbear. going there to find her, simply because it was in a portion of his district remote from his office, and therefore inconvenient to him to make per- eonal service. To admit such an excuse would be to deny the benefit of equal laws to all parts of the district, and to infliot a penalty upon those who happen to live at a distance from the marshal's office. �The marshal sought for the respondent's husband at Long Island city. Had he found him there it would not have aided him in making Personal service upon the respondent. It was possible her residence might have been changed, and the marshal might properly enough have Bought her husband to be assured of that fact; but, not having found him, his duty remained of seeking her at her last known place of residence, the only place she was at all likely to be found. Had the marshal found the husband it would only have resulted in inform- ing him that the respondent could be served at Saugerties, and of this fact the marshal already had sufficient presumptive evidence. Had the real purpose been to find and serve the respondent, no reason appears why inquiry should not have been made of the master of the tug before serving the attachment, instead of immediately afterwards, when the respondent's residence at Saugerties was again indicated. The fact, moreover, that the libellant's proctor had, before filing the libel, sought for the respondent's husband at Long Island city, and been informed of his continued absence from his place of business there, leads to the inference that the marshal's renewed inquiry for the husband or for the respondent at Long Island city instead of at Saugerties, together with the absence of in- quiry at the tug before attaching her, could scarcely have been for the purpose or with the expectation of finding or serving her, but rather as a pro forma preliminary to an intended attachment of the tug without any serious endeavor to serve the respondent. �The case seems to be entirely within the principle of the decision of Judge Choate in the case of the International Ceiling Co. v. Dill, (unreported; to appear in 10 Ben.,) where it was held that, in the absence of any previous endeavor to make personal service upon the ��� �
