514 FEDEEAL REPORTER. �one term in the me'aning of the act. If, howover, -we are to give any efiect to the words "or extended," in this enactment, it must be that the term for which the letters patent shall be granted originally, and the term for which the letters patent is extended, are two distinct terms. Instead of construing this clause as if it read "all actions shall be brought during the term of the monopoly, or within six years after the expiration thereof," it should be construed as if it read, "all actions shall be brought during the term for which letters patent shall be granted, or during .the term for which letters patent shall be extended, or within six years after the expiration thereof;" "thereof" referring to the original or extended term, as the case may be. �It is not true that letters patent run for only one term when the patent is extended. In such a case there are two terms, — the origi- nal term and the extended term, — and, though the law provides that when a patent is extended it shall have the same effect in law as though it had been originally granted for 21 years, that does not change this fact, nor does it change, the fact that the original term was for 14 years, and not 21 yeats. The act does not provide that the two terms shall be considered as one term in law, but simply provides that the extension of a patent shall have the mine effect in law as though it had been originally granted for 21 years. I think congress has, in the clause under consideration, olearly recognized that an extended term and the original term of letters patent are distinct terms. �An extended term of letters patent oan have the same effect in law as though it had been granted for 21 years, in the granting of a monopoly, without extending the time of the bar of the statute of limitation on existing causes of action. The patent right is quite distinct from the causes of action which a patentee may have for its infringement, and beeause a patent right may be extended it does not follow that the time within which such causes of action should be brought should also be extended. If we are not correct in our construction of this act, then congress has given the commissioner of patents the power to extend, in his discretion, the time in which the statute of limitation bars existing causes of action. This would be an extraordinary delegation of authority, and one which the courts should hesitate to recognize unless the legislative will was clearly expressed, �There is some conflict in the decision as to the proper construction of this clause of the act of 1870, but the weight of authority sustains ��� �