IN BB CODDING. 849 �In re Codding & Eossell, Bankruptsj {District Court, W. B. Pennsylvania. December 21, 1881.) �1. PARTifERSHiP — Real Estatb. �Real estate owned and held by copartners as partnership property, and brought into the firm stock, is not converted absolutely and lor all purposes. It is to be treated as personalty, in go far as may be neces' ai-y to sccure the paynient of the flrni debts and advances made by the partners respectlvely, but for every other purpose it remains real estate. �2. SAMB — JUDGMEKT— LiBKB. �A judgment against a partnership for a partncrship debt, entered by confes- sion of all the partners, is a lien upon the partnership real estate. �In Bankruptcy. Sur exceptions to register's report, distributing fund frona sale of real estate. �Wm. A. Stone, for report. �John W. Mix and Williams e Angle, for exceptants. �AcHEsoN, D. J. This contest is over a fund realized from the real estate of the bankrupts, sold by the assignee divested of liens. The claimants are Lawrence Butler and Matth'ew Jackson, two judgment creditors of the bankrupt firm on the one hand, and, on the other, the assignee in bankruptcy. The judgments are not assailed as unlawful preferences, but it is denied that they were liens against the real estate ; and therefore the assignee daims the fund for the benefit of the general creditors of the firm. �No exceptions having been filed to the register's findings of fact, their correctness will be assumed. These findings are substantially as follows �John A. Codding and Chauncey S. Eussell, the bankrupts, composed the firm of Codding & Ruasell. The said real estate was owned and held by the bankrupts, as copartners, for partnership purposes and as partnershi{) property. The judgment of Lawrence Butler was entered against "Codding, Eussell & Ce," (a name by which the firm wa« formerly designates,) upon a judgment note signed " Codding, Eussell & Co." The judgment of Matthew Jackson wa.s entered against " Codding & Eussell," upon a judgment note signed " Codding & Eussell." The consideration of each note was tnoney loaned to and used by the partnership. Both partners participated in giving the notes, and the judgments thereon were each entered at the suggestion of both the partners. �Any question growing out of the Butler judgment note having been �entered up in the old firm name may be dismissed from the case; �for the Jackson judgment alone, under the rule which prevails in this �court to allow interest on a judgment down to the time of distribu- �v.9,no.l5 — 54 ��� �
