Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/118

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i. the insufficiency of naked constitutional restrictions, No. XLVII. 343
A. the tendency of the legislature to absorb the others, 343
a. from the nature of our political organization, 344
b. from "an intrepid confidence in its own strength," 344
c. from necessary extent of its powers, 345
d. from its control of the pecuniary resources of the country, and the indefiniteness of its authority in many cases, 345
e. from the examples presented in history, 345
B. an instance of executive encroachment accounted for, 348
C. concluding remarks, 348
ii. Mr. Jefferson's proposition, that, two thirds of the members of each of two of the departments concurring, an appeal to the People may be taken, considered, XLVIII. 349
A. the People the only source of authority, 349
B. the propriety of a well-defined mode of appealing to the People considered, 350
C. it does reach the case of an improper combination of two departments of the government, 350
D. by frequent applications it might impair the respect with which the People would regard the government, 350
E. the public tranquillity might be disturbed by a too frequent recurrence to the decision of the society, 351
F. the decisions thus obtained would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government, 352
a. the legislature will still control the decision, 352
b. members of the legislature will probably be the members of the conventions to revise the form of government, 353
c. when such appeals to the People, against the legislature, will be useful, 353
G. concluding remarks on occasional appeals to the People, 354
iii. periodical appeals to the People considered, XLIX. 354
A. the disadvantage of short intervals discussed, 355