Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/127

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Contents.
cxxv
Essay. Page
v. Crete referred to, No. LXII. 442
c. objection, that the Senate will "gradually acquire a dangerous preëminence in the government and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy," considered, 442
i. the impossibility of such a result averred and discussed, 443
ii. the organization of the Senate of Maryland referred to, 443
iii. the organization of the two Houses of the British Parliament, 444
iv. the examples of the ancient republics referred to, 444
i. Sparta and her Ephori, 444
ii. Rome and her Tribunes, 444
iii. Carthage and her Senate, 445
v. the controlling influence of the House of Representatives, 445
E. "the powers vested in the Senate," LXIII. 446
a. the treaty-making power, 446
i. the great importance of that power, 446
ii. the authority to exercise it vested in those who will be best qualified to exercise it, 446
iii. a popular assembly does not possess such qualifications, 447
i. an intimate acquaintance with public affairs necessary, 447
ii. secrecy and despatch are often required, 449
iv. objections to this part of the proposed Constitution considered, 450
i. that the treaty-making power has not been delegated to men invested with legislative authority, 450
ii. that treaties so entered into are to be of supreme authority, 451
iii. that treaties so entered into are not repealable at pleasure, like Acts of Assembly, 451
iv. that they may be made instruments of oppression, 451
v. that proper guards against corruption are wanting, 452
A. the responsibility of senators considered, 452
v. concluding remarks, 453
b. the appointing of public officers, LXIV. 453
c. its authority as a court for the trial of impeachments, 453
i. the difficulty in forming such a court, in an elective government, 453