Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/448

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304
The Fœderalist.

calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of citizens may become a majority of persons, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the Constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular Government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves.

In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of Confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of Judges, they would unite the affection of friends. Happy would it be, if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free Governments; if a project equally effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind!

Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a Constitutional right; the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the compass of human probability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the Fœderal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity, for which no possible Constitution can provide a cure.

Among the advantages of a Confederate republic, enumerated by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that