On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the People, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State Governments, who will be supported by the People.
On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the Fœderal Government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State Governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 1, 1788.]
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed Government and the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this Government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts.
One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the Fœderal Government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty.