lar example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in septennial elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the People can be in no danger from biennial elections.
The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened, by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the Fœderal Legislature will possess a part only of that supreme Legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial Assemblies and the Irish Legislature. It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on another occasion, been shown, that the Fœderal Legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on the People as other Legislative bodies are, but that it will be moreover watched and controlled by the several collateral Legislatures, which other Legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the Fœderal Government, for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the People, and the means of influence over the popular branch, possessed by the other branches of the Government above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the Fœderal Representatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.
