and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown, that I am disposed neither to deny its existence, nor to undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing, that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient Governments on the subject of representation, is by no means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts, in support of what I advance.
In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the Executive functions were performed, not by the People themselves, but by officers elected by the People, and representing the People in their Executive capacity.
Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons, annually elected by the People at large. The degree of power delegated to them, seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find an Assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred members, annually elected by the People; and partially representing them in their Legislative capacity, since they were not only associated with the People in the function of making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating Legislative propositions to the People. The Senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the duration of its appointment, appears to have been elective by the suffrages of the People. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the popular Governments of antiquity.
Lastly, in Sparta, we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in numbers, but annually elected by the whole body of the People, and considered as the Representatives of the People, almost in their plenipotentiary capacity. The