Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/638

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494
The Fœderalist.

their removal from office, or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.

In England, the King is a perpetual Magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that Kingdom, than to annex to the King a constitutional Council, who may be responsible to the Nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the Executive department, an idea inadmissible in a free Government. But even there, the King is not bound by the resolutions of his Council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office; and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him, at his sole discretion.

But in a Republic, where every Magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office, the reason, which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a Council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the Chief Magistrate; which serves in some degree as a hostage to the National justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

The idea of a Council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State Constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbal-