tive, if it had wanted this important feature of good Government. The experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on the excellence of the institution.
[From M'Lean's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]
[THE FŒDERALIST.] No. LXXIX.
[To the People of the State of New York:]
NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the Judges, than a fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable here. In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the Judicial from the Legislative power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the latter. The enlightened friends to good Government, in every State, have seen cause to lament the want of precise and explicit precautions in the State Constitutions on this head. Some of these indeed have declared, that permanent[1] salaries should be established for the Judges; but the experiment has in some instances shown, that such expressions are not sufficiently definite to preclude Legislative evasions. Something still more positive and unequivocal has been evinced to be requisite. The plan of the Convention accordingly has provided, that the
- ↑ Vide Constitution of Massachusetts, Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 13.—Publius.
