Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/101

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
INTRODUCTION.
73

unguardedly, that the first was the question of philosophy. Socrates very speedily undeceived him; for surely no philosophy is required to teach us that the different kinds of knowledge are the mathematical, the historical, the grammatical, and so forth. The other alternative, therefore (although Socrates here gives us no light), must be the question of philosophy, and it is so. It is the foundation- question—the beginning, with no anterior beginning; and its answer is the absolute starting-point of metaphysics, or speculative science.

That philosophy has a starting-point proved by the fact that its starting-point has been found.§ 83. An anterior question may indeed be raised—Is there any identical quality, any common centre, any essential rallying-point in all our cognitions? But that question can be determined only by the result of the research.[1] If there is no such point, or if no such point can be found, no philosophy is possible; but if such a common point or quality can be found, and is found, then philosophy can exist, and can go forth tracing out the consequences which flow from the answer she has given. That
  1. Perhaps this question ought to have been discussed in the Introduction as one of the preliminary article of the science. Its settlement, showing that there is such a point or element, should, in strict order, precede the proposition which declares what that element is. But such advantages in the way of clearness and intelligibility are gained by keeping the starting-point (Proposition I.) just as it is,—for, after all, it is the true commencement; and so much discussion arises under the question referred to, that it has been thought bettor to introduce it, at a later stage, into the body of the work. It forms the thesis of Proposition VI.