PROP. I.————
It declares that self-consciousness is never entirely suspended when the mind knows anythingattention appears to be exclusively occupied with matters quite distinct from ourselves. The knowledge of self is the running accompaniment to all our knowledge. It is through and along with this knowledge that all other knowledge is taken in.
Objection that self-consciousness seems at times to be extinct.4. An objection may be raised to this proposition on the ground that it is contradicted by experience. It may be said that when we are plunged in the active pursuits of life, or engaged in the contemplation of natural objects, we frequently pass hours, it may be days, without ever thinking of ourselves. This objection seems to militate against the truth of our first proposition. How is it to be obviated?
Objection obviated. Proposition explained.5. If the proposition maintained, that our attention was at all times clearly and forcibly directed upon ourselves, or that the me was constantly a prominent object of our regard, the objection would be fatal to its pretensions. The proposition would be at once disproved by an appeal to experience; for it is certain that during the greater part of our time we take but little heed of ourselves. But a man may take very little note, without taking absolutely no note of himself. The proposition merely asserts that a man (or any other intelligence) is never altogether incognisant, is never totally oblivious, of himself even when his attention is most engaged with other matters. However far it may