Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/156

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128
INSTITUTES OF METAPHYSIC.

PROP. IV.————

some perception of this law; but having passed on to the question of existence before he had thoroughly ascertained the laws of knowledge, and in particular before he had mastered the condition of all knowledge, as laid down in Proposition I., he has reached an ontological conclusion affirming the non-absolute existence of matter, which, however true it may be, is ambiguous, precipitate, and ill-matured,—and indeed not intelligible; for nothing which is ambiguous is intelligible.

How Prop. IV. decides this preliminary question. How Counter-proposition IV. decides it.10. It is obvious that this system decides this preliminary question in the affirmative, declaring unequivocally that there is a necessary law which prevents all intelligence from knowing matter per se,—just as the counter-proposition decides it in the negative, declaring that there is none. The affirmative answer follows by a very short remove from Proposition I., in which the primary condition of all knowing is fixed. The negative answer is based on a denial of Proposition I.,—in other words, on the rejection of a necessary truth of reason.

Symbols illustrative of the position maintained by the Institutes.11. A few more explanations may be offered. Attention to the following symbols will enable the reader to understand exactly the position advocated by these Institutes in regard to our knowledge of material things, as contrasted with the position occupied by ordinary thinking, and also maintained by