PROP. IV.————
under which we may be supposed to labour (and surely we have a sufficiency of imperfections without increasing their number through a miscalculation), but in virtue of a law binding upon all intelligence. The law is that all intelligence (every Y, actual or possible) must know itself along with whatever it is cognisant of, (Prop. I.) Therefore matter per se cannot possibly be known by any intelligence, be its constitution what it may; for every intelligence in knowing matter must know itself as well. X per se is thus fixed as absolutely unknowable all round,—all round the circle of intelligence; and here, at least, we lie under no special disadvantage, if disadvantage it be. "Know me," says X per se to one Y.—"I cannot," says that Y "for I must know myself as well." "Know me," says X per se to another and differently constituted Y.—"I cannot," says this other Y, "for I must know myself as well." "Know me," says X per se to a third and again differently constituted Y.—"I cannot do it," says this third Y, "for I am under the necessity of knowing myself along with you:" and so on, round the whole circle. Thus X per se meets with a rebuff from every quarter—cannot get known on any terms by any intelligence. Independent matter is thus shut out from all cognition by a necessary law of all reason. The primary condition of all knowledge closes the door in its face. So much for the psychological averment that matter
