THEORY OF KNOWING.
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PROP. IV.————
but to matter per se itself.18. But the case is very different in regard to the contradiction at present under consideration. These Institutes differ entirely from psychology in their doctrine as to the primary condition of all knowledge. They contend, not simply that a man can know things only when they are presented to his mind, but that he can know them when only he himself is presented to his mind along with them. This position, in fixing the knowledge of self as the condition of all knowledge, fixes self, moreover, as an integral and essential part of every object of cognition (see Prop. III., obs. 3). When that integral part, therefore, is supposed to be withdrawn, as it is in the case of matter per se, the inevitable effect is, that the remaining part of the object of cognition—to wit, matter per se—lapses into a contradiction. It becomes a mere absurdity. It is not simply unknown, it is absolutely unknowable; because, upon the terms of this system, the only object knowable by any mind is an object made up of a thing (the element called non-ego) and a mind or self (the element called ego). Here, then, the contradiction besieges not merely the knowledge of the thing, but the thing itself. The difference between the two contradictions may be illustrated in this way. The cognisance of a circle is contradictory, unless that figure be presented, either really or ideally, to the mind. This contradiction, however, is limited exclusively to the cognisance; it does not
