CONTENTS.
xiii
5. | The counter-proposition is equally contradictory, whether accepted without, or with, a restriction, | 261 |
6. | The counter-proposition is the foundation of "sensualism"—character of sensualism, | 261 |
7. | The anti-sensual psychology merely restricts the counter-proposition—leaves the contradiction uncorrected, | 263 |
8. | The root of the mischief. History of distinction between sense and intellect, | 264 |
9. | Aim and procedure of Greek metaphysics, | 264 |
10. | A rule for the historian of philosophy, | 266 |
11. | This rule observed in these Institutes, | 266 |
12. | Return to history of distinction between sense and intellect, | 267 |
13. | Illustration of early Greek doctrine, | 269 |
14. | The old philosophers were right in their problem—in their way of working it, and in fixing sense as the faculty of nonsense, | 270 |
15. | A reason why the truth of this doctrine is not obvious, | 271 |
16. | Difficulty and difference of opinion as to intellectual element, | 272 |
17. | Ambiguities of the old philosophers, | 273 |
18. | Three misconceptions arising out of these ambiguities, | 273 |
19. | Comment on first misconception, | 275 |
20. | Comment on second misconception, | 276 |
21. | Comment on third misconception, | 277 |
22. | Key to the Greek philosophy, | 279 |
23. | Return to counter-proposition. It is founded on a confusion of the distinction between sense and intellect, | 281 |
24. | The Lockian and the Kantian psychology in limiting the counter-proposition effect no subversion of sensualism, | 282 |
25. | Kant's doctrine impotent against sensualism, | 283 |
26. | The statement in par. 4, and the charge in par. 7, are borne out by the foregoing remarks, | 286 |
27. | Kant sometimes nearly right. He errs through a neglect of necessary truth, | 287 |
28. | The true compromise between Sense and Intellect, | 288 |
PROPOSITION XI. | ||
Presentation and Representation, | 290 | |
Demonstration, | 290 | |
Observations and Explanations, | 291 | |
1. | Why this proposition is introduced, | 291 |
2. | Distinction between knowing and thinking, | 292 |
3. | This proposition the foundation of a true philosophy of experience, | 293 |
4. | Representation—its two insuperable restrictions, | 293 |
5. | First restriction by way of addition. Second by way of subtraction, | 294 |
6. | The latter restriction unrecognised by philosophers. Eleventh Counter-proposition, | 295 |
7. | Its invalidity shown, | 296 |
8. | The minimum cogitable equates with the minimum scibile, | 296 |
9. | Dr Reid's mistake in his assault on representationism, | 297 |
10. | The truth and the error of representationism, | 299
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