PROP. VI.————
others consist only of that which is common to all, or to many cognitions. In short, that some cognitions are mere particular cognitions, and that others are mere universal cognitions; or, more shortly, that either factor by itself may constitute a cognition.
Further statement of ambiguity.14. The same ambiguity pervades his doctrine of the particular and the universal, considered in relation to existence. It may either mean that every existence is both particular and universal—that each existing thing has a part peculiar to itself, and a part common to all, or to many existing things; or it may mean that every existence is either particular or universal; in other words, that some beings contain only that which is peculiar to them, while others consist only of that which is common to all or to many beings; in short, that some existences are mere particular existences, and that others are mere universal or general existences.
Illustration of the ambiguity.15. Or the question may be put in this way: Is Plato's analysis of knowledge and of existence a division of these into elements (a particular element and a universal element), or is it a division of them into kinds (a particular kind and a universal kind)? It is obvious that these divisions are very different, and that, until we know which of the two is intended, we can make no progress, and should run into extreme confusion, were we to acknowledge no