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INSTITUTES OF METAPHYSIC.
PROP. VI.————
of knowledge which is particular, and another kind which is universal or general. The particular cognitions are cognitions of particular things only—such as this tree, that book, and so forth. These precede the universal or general cognitions, which are subsequent formations. The latter are cognitions, not of universal things, but of nonentities. They are mere fabrications of the mind formed by means of abstraction and generalisation. They are also termed conceptions or general notions,—such notions as are expressed by the words, man, animal, tree, and all other terms denoting genera and species."
This counter-proposition is itself a proof of the charge here made against philosophers.21. The statement of this counter-proposition is sufficient of itself to prove the truth of the charge advanced against philosophers, namely, that they have misinterpreted the Platonic analysis, and have mistaken for cognitions what Plato laid down as mere elements of cognition—and which, being mere elements of cognitions, could not, by any possibility, be cognitions themselves. For it is certain that, in the opinion of psychology as declared in this counter-proposition, the particular cognitions are entertained by the mind before the general ones are formed, which they could not be held to be, unless they were held to be a distinct species of cognition. But if the particular are held to be distinct from the general cognitions, it is plain that the latter must be held to be distinct from the former. It is also certain that