Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/335

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THEORY OF KNOWING.
307

PROP. XII.————

evasive mode of arguing. It deprives matter per se of every chance of being conceived or represented.

It cannot be reached by the way of inference.10. And let it not be supposed that matter per se can be reached by the way of inference. Whatever can be conceived inferentially, must be conceived as the object of possible, though not of actual cognition. But there is no potential knowledge, in any quarter, of matter per se, as has been already sufficiently established. It can be conceived only as the object of no possible knowledge; and therefore it cannot be conceived as an inference, except on the understanding that this inference is a finding of the contradictory, or of that which cannot be conceived on any terms by any intelligence.

Why the discussion respecting matter per se is important.11. It may be proper at this place to remark, parenthetically, that the discussion respecting matter per se is interesting and important, not so much on account of any conclusion as to the independent existence or non-existence of matter which the inquiry may lead to, as on account of the truths in regard to knowing and thinking which the research brings to light. Philosophers have been too apt to overlook this consideration, and to suppose that the main object of the research was to prove something either pro or con respecting material existence. That, however, is a point of very secondary import-