PROP. XIII.————
the total synthesis of thought, in that case, be objects plus another me plus me? It is true that the synthesis which each of us cogitates is of this character. But the explanation is this: Propositions I. and II. lay down the essential constituents of all cognition, and, consequently, of all conception. These elements are not necessarily more than objects plus one self. This is all that is necessary to constitute a case of knowledge or of thought. These propositions enunciate that universal truth. Therefore, although I cannot cogitate things plus another self without taking my own self into account as well, yet I can perfectly well understand how such a case (to wit, a case of objects plus another subject) should take place without my having anything to do with it. There is no necessity whatever for me to take into account any other self, when I am cognisant of things plus my individual me; and, therefore, there is no necessity for another self to take me into account, when he is cognisant of himself and the things by which he is surrounded. All this I can understand perfectly well. And, therefore, although it is true that I must cogitate myself whenever I think of another self in union with things, still I can conceive that other self, and the things he is cognisant of, to subsist, although I were entirely withdrawn, or had never been called into existence. But I cannot conceive things to subsist without any "me" in my supposed annihilation. For to con-
