Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/349

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PROPOSITION XIV.


THE PHENOMENAL IN COGNITION.


There is no mere phenomenal in cognition; in other words, the phenomenal by itself is absolutely unknowable and inconceivable.


DEMONSTRATION.

The first premise fixes the definition of phenomenon. "Whatever can be known or conceived only when something else is known or conceived along with it, is a phenomenon, or the phenomenal." But whatever can only be so known or conceived, cannot be known or conceived by itself. Therefore there is no mere phenomenal in cognition; in other words, the phenomenal by itself is absolutely unknowable and inconceivable.


OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

Fourteenth counter-proposition.1. Fourteenth counter-proposition.—"There is nothing but the phenomenal in cognition; in other words, the phenomenal alone is knowable and conceivable by us."