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INSTITUTES OF METAPHYSIC.
PROP. XVII.————
nition or of existence), inasmuch as there can be no synthesis at all without this definable and definite factor, that it was regarded as almost equivalent, singly or by itself, to the whole synthesis. It swallowed up, as it were, the other or particular factor, the varieties of which, being contingent, were incessantly changing, and being inexhaustible, were, of course, not to be defined. And hence the terms referred to (εἶδος, ἰδέα, νοητόν), which properly represented only a part of the synthesis of cognition (or the phenomenal), came also to represent the whole synthesis (or the substantial).
And cleared up by a reference to the Institutional doctrine.20. If this somewhat abstruse exposition be construed into the terms which the Institutes employ to designate the substantial in cognition, the cause which has given rise to the ambiguity in question will be understood exactly. I-myself—("the universal" of the older systems)—I-myself-with-the-addition-of-some-thing-or-thought—this synthesis, and nothing less, is the substantial in cognition, because it alone can be known without anything else being known. But the part called "I-myself" is so much the more important and essential factor of the two, that it is very apt to be regarded as constituting, by itself the substantial in cognition, while the particular element, the thing or thought, is very apt to be regarded as alone constituting the phenomenal