Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/385

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THEORY OF KNOWING.
357

PROP. XVII.————

easily said; not so easily done. And supposing it done; suppose we have shown what great geniuses we are by turning away the mind from the sense;—what then? What is the next step? Doubtless the insinuation is that we shall be rewarded by a glorious intuition of Platonic substance. But did any man, did Cicero himself, ever find it so? We may confidently answer—no. No man ever came to a good end in philosophy who tried to reach the truth by casting his senses behind him, or who strove to make his way by endeavoring to get on without them. This is one of those traditional maxims which, originally a high-flavoured, although ambiguous truth, has been handed down through a long succession of philosophic vintners, not one of whom understood its spirit, until it has come to us with all its aroma evaporated—the very refuse, or last deposit, of dregs which have been depositing dregs since ever philosophy had a name.

The true meaning of turning the mind away from the senses.25. The true meaning of turning the mind away from the senses, is not that we should turn away from the senses and their presentations (the material world), and explore utter vacuity by means of a faculty wherewith we are not endowed; but that, holding the data of sense steadily before us, we should bring ourselves to see that a non-sensible element which we had overlooked, and which we