Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/409

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
THEORY OF KNOWING.
381

PROP. XXI.————

things was wholly relative. And so it is, when looked at in that way. Each term can be known only in relation to the other term. But why cannot both of the terms be looked at together. Why can the completed relation not be taken into account? The relationists have neglected that consideration. In point of fact, the two terms are always looked at and apprehended together. And it is a sufficient refutation of the relationist doctrine to ask—what is this total synthesis known in relation to? If our knowledge of it is a relative knowledge, we must know it in relation to something. What is that something—what is the correlative of this completed synthesis? Psychology can give no answer—can point out no correlative. Hence this synthesis is the known Absolute. It stands disengaged or absolved in thought from all connection with anything else. When psychology can point out the correlative factor of this entire and isolated synthesis, she may then maintain with some show of reason that our knowledge is wholly relative; but until she can do this, she must vail her flag before the standard of the absolutists.

Kant on the Absolute.10. Kant was of opinion that he had hit upon a notable refutation of the doctrine of the Absolute when he declared, that, "whatever we know must be known in conformity to the constitution of our faculties of cognition." Of course, it must. And