Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/412

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384



PROPOSITION XXII.


THE CONTINGENT CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.


The senses are the contingent conditions of knowledge; in other words, it is possible that intelligences different from the human (supposing that there are such) should apprehend things under other laws, or in other ways, than those of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling; or, more shortly, our senses are not laws of cognition, or modes of apprehension, which are binding on intelligence necessarily and universally.


DEMONSTRATION.

A Contingent law of knowledge must, first of all, be defined. "A contingent law of knowledge is one which, although complied with in certain cases in the attainment of knowledge, is not enforced by reason as a condition which must be complied with wherever knowledge is to take place." Knowledge