428
PROPOSITION VI.
IGNORANCE OF THE UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR.
We cannot be ignorant either of the universal element of cognition per se, or of the particular element of cognition per se.
DEMONSTRATION.
We cannot be ignorant of the universal element apart from the particular element, or of the particular element apart from the universal element of cognition, because (by Prop. VI. Epistemology) there can be no knowledge of the universal apart from the particular, or of the particular apart from the universal. But what there can be no knowledge of; there can be no ignorance of (Prop. III. Agnoiology). Therefore we cannot be ignorant of the universal element of cognition per se, or of the particular element of cognition per se.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
1. Just as the preceding propositions (IV. and V.) are the obverse of the second and fourth of the
