Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/473

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THEORY OF IGNORANCE.
445

PROP. VIII.————

jects without a subject could be the objects of our ignorance, because object plus-subject is their whole word for the mind—just as object is the whole word for the mind, in the estimation of popular thinking. "Object plus subject" is to speculation precisely what "object" is to ordinary thinking; and hence, just as ordinary thinking always supposes that objects of one kind or another are the only objects either of our knowledge or of our ignorance, and would be outraged by the statement that a mere part or syllable of this word could express either what we know, or what we are ignorant of—so speculative thinking maintains, and calls upon people to understand, that objects-plus-a-subject are the only objects either of our knowledge or of our ignorance, and is equally outraged by the supposition that any of the syllables of this entire and indivisible mental word can give a true or intelligible expression either to what we know or to what we are ignorant of. The want of accordance between language and thought—or, otherwise expressed, the fact that thought is not susceptible of being divided or split down into fractions to such an extent as words appear to divide it into, and consequently the necessity of guarding against the supposition that the division of words has a corresponding analysis of thoughts—might furnish a theme for much interesting discussion; but this is a topic which cannot be pursued at present.