Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/475

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THEORY OF IGNORANCE.
447

PROP. VIII.————

know, and that, therefore, mere objects cannot be known, but only objects along with oneself or the subject; further, that we cannot think of less than can be known; and that therefore, mere objects cannot be conceived, but only objects along with some self or subject. The main business of the agnoiology has been to correct the third inadvertency, and to show that we cannot be ignorant of less than can be known, and that therefore, mere objects cannot be what we are ignorant of; but only objects along with some self or subject. From these considerations it is obvious that philosophers have erred, not, as is usually supposed, in consequence of striving to know more than they are competent to know, but in consequence of striving to know less than they are permitted to know by the laws and limits of intelligence; and further, that they have gone astray, not, as is usually supposed, in consequence of denying our ignorance to be as great as it really is, but in consequence of maintaining that our ignorance is not so great as it really is—in other words, in consequence of maintaining that we are ignorant of less than it is possible for any intelligence to be ignorant of.

Concluding remark.15. In conclusion, and in reference to what is said in the first proposition of the agnoiology (Obs. 6.), this remark has to be added, that all the counter-propositions would have stood their ground, and